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The Intellectual Property Rights (IPR) elements of the DIME Network currently focus on research in the area of patents, 
copyrights and related rights. DIME’s IPR research is at the forefront as it addresses and debates current political and 
controversial IPR issues that affect businesses, nations and societies today. These issues challenge state of the art thinking and 
the existing analytical frameworks that dominate theoretical IPR literature in the fields of economics, management, politics, law 
and regulation- theory.   1






To an economist observing corporate strategy during this age of the emergence and 
development of internet and the digital economy, one thing is clear: the move towards a New 
Economy has heightened both the use and the strategic exploitation of intellectual property by 
economic players. The very particular field of research constituted by intellectual property, 
which draws on the scientific disciplines of economics and law as well as the field of 
management, has already been studied for several decades. It continues to arouse widespread 
curiosity now, because of the scale of the current phenomenon. Although intellectual property 
and its subset, industrial property, have been in existence for a very long time (the origins of 
patents can be traced back to the Parte Venezzia of fifteenth century Italy), it is only over the 
last twenty years that its scope and use have grown on such a massive, unprecedented scale, 
accompanied by an equally dramatic rise in the difficulties it provokes. During the twentieth 
century, the protection of inventions by patent has regularly accompanied every new phase in 
technological innovation
2 (Kline and Rivette, 2000). And this trend has continued recently 
during the explosion of internet and the digital economy, with software programmes, for 
example, which play an indispensable role in this domain, themselves becoming the object of 
patent protection. 
Today, intellectual property is no longer simply a means of legally protecting inventions, as it 
was during previous phases of technological innovation. Now, there is more at stake than the 
simple concern to prevent plagiarism and pirating. This concern is now associated, at least for 
a certain number of economic players, with the need to go on the offensive, by introducing 
licensing policies or enhancing the value of immaterial assets, to hinder or even prevent rivals 
from operating, to establish their own specific technological standards, and so on. And this 
vision of intellectual property as a strategic tool cannot be attributed solely to companies. It is 
shared by players of a more political or institutional nature, who envisage intellectual property 
as a weapon of economic competitiveness.  
 
In the first section, we shall explore the way in which political and/or institutional authorities 
deal with intellectual property, particularly with the aim of boosting the competitiveness of 
certain sectors. Developments in jurisprudence over the last twenty years, both in the United 
States and in Europe, show that two domains have been particularly affected by the increasing 
importance of patent protection: living matter and software (Kortum and Lerner, 1998). Most 
notably, the various American Courts of Justice and the European Patent Office (EPO) have 
agreed to grant patents on software. The same cannot be said, however, for another specific 
object: business methods. These systems, deeply involved in e-business, are perceived in 
different ways and accorded different levels of protection on either side of the Atlantic. 
 
In the second section, we shall analyse industrial property as an offensive weapon in the 
hands of economic players. We know that it plays a crucial role in the introduction of 
technological standards. To the extent that certain key sectors (telecommunications, 
                                                 
1Assistant Professor, University of Paris Nord, Centre d’Economie de Paris Nord (CEPN) liotard@seg.univ-
paris13.fr 
2 The telegraph and electricity in the 1880s, the car and aviation industries (1900-1920), aerospace and synthetic 
materials in the 1960s and the high-tech boom since the 1980s were all accompanied by an intensive wave of 
patent registrations.   2
computing, software, etc.) are built around network effects and increasing returns of adoption, 
obtaining these returns has become the key challenge in the race to establish standards, where 
the winner is the one who obtains them first. Industrial property is a determinant factor in 
these strategies. It is interesting to investigate whether the same strategies deployed in past 
examples of the standards race are still used today in the context of internet and the digital 
economy. In particular, we shall analyse the standards war over internet browsers (Explorer 
and Netscape). Nearer to home, we shall give an overview of the forces present in the domain 
of DRM (Digital Rights Management), systems which enable the operation of legal music 
downloading sites. We shall also focus our attention on the effects of the unrelenting use of 
industrial property, in terms of innovation, competition and the sharp rise in litigation.  
 
1) Strengthening of intellectual property, software and business methods  
 
1.1) Why more protection for software? 
The growing importance of software since the 1970s has been accompanied by reflection on 
the best means of protection to adopt for this technological object of an increasingly generic 
nature. During the 1960s and 1970s, software programmes only enjoyed limited protection. 
They were produced on order, for specific customers. The industry saw little need to establish 
high levels of protection because of the lack of compatibility between machines and 
programmes: this incompatibility generated its own de facto protection, and the 
implementation of legal means of appropriation was not considered. Trade secrets were the 
only method used to protect the source code of programmes (Graham and Mowery, 2002). 
But the structure of the software market has changed since the 1970s: software developed for 
one customer and one very specific type of machine has given way to packaged software. In 
this context, programmes are being used on an ever-growing number of computers. The 
manufacturers, motivated by the objective of selling to the greatest possible number of 
customers and diffusing their programmes as widely as possible, have realised that protection 
by means of trade secrets has become outdated and ineffective.  
 
In the United States, for example, after passing through a stage of protection by copyright 
thanks to the Computer Software Copyright Act of 1980, the manufacturers then lobbied for 
intensified protection through patents. So the strengthening in protection, through intellectual 
property, has indeed been the result of the growth in the standardised software market. In 
parallel, the emergence of internet has been a crucial factor in explaining this desire to 
establish stronger protection for software. A channel wonderfully adapted to the instantaneous 
diffusion of digital works (literature, music, software programmes, etc.) without any 
reproduction costs, internet has heightened the urgency for software producers to respond to 
these dramatic changes by pushing for stronger protection.  
 
This emphasis on intellectual property can also be interpreted as an attempted solution to the 
weak competitiveness of the United States at the beginning of the 1980s, a period when the 
country was seeking new vectors of growth in the face of heightened competition from Asia 
and Germany. Academic research was running out of resources, because of cuts in research 
funding and the priority given to balancing the federal books. This resulted in the academic 
world moving closer to industry which, having reduced its own research capacities, was also 
seeking a rapprochement with the universities. In this context, the “military” arm of the 
strategy was the policy of intellectual property, which gave a massive boost to academic   3
research on the one hand, and extended patent protection to new domains, offering new 
opportunities for competitiveness, on the other
3.  
 
1.2) The legal tools used 
Software has traditionally been considered as a work of authorship. As such, it has been 
covered by the droit d’auteur in Europe or by copyright in the United States. But over the last 
twenty years, and more particularly the last ten years, American law has been modified by 
numerous cases of jurisprudence, with the result that patents are assuming an ever more 
important role in the protection of software. This trend has also been evident in Europe, where 
several decisions by the European Patent Office (EPO) now offer the possibility of patenting 
computer programmes, but in a more restricted manner than in the United States.  
 
In the U.S., the traditional framework of software protection by copyright has been 
overturned by a series of cases of jurisprudence. This movement, which has really got under 
way since the 1980s, has gradually led to the juridical acceptance of patent protection. This 
can be explained by one underlying reason: copyright protection and patent protection do not 
have the same scope. The creator of software protected by copyright can, if he so wishes, 
prohibit the reproduction of his work and limit the spread of license concessions of his 
copyright. The problem resides in the behaviour of his competitors (do they draw inspiration 
from his software to offer a similar product?) and questions relating to reverse engineering 
(Desrousseaux, 2000). We know that ideas are not appropriable. Only the form is protected 
by copyright (not the function). But as a given functionality can often be achieved through 
more than one way of programming, a rival who has no right, theoretically, to copy a certain 
programme can create a different programme (thus getting round the copyright) offering the 
same functionality. In this case, it is very difficult to judge on a possible infringement of 
copyright, especially if the competitor has used the “clean room” method
4. And although 
reverse engineering is theoretically prohibited, it is actually necessary in certain situations 
(e.g. the development of software interfaces). In this context, it is difficult to bring the 
juridical framework of copyright into play to protect against the actions of a rival.  
Unlike copyright, patents on software protect the functional interrelations between the 
technological components of the system (Skulikaris, 2001). Consequently, it is no longer the 
form of the software that is protected, but a series of functions (functional protection) – the 
result, in other words. Here, the protection provided by patents appears to be stronger than 
that provided by copyright. 
 
a) Wholesale patent protection in the United States 
In the United States, the decisive turning-point came in 1980 with the case Diamond v Diehr. 
Up until this date, the Supreme Court of the United States, the court of last resort for patent 
disputes, had systematically supported the USPTO (US Patent and Trademark Office) in its 
desire not to grant patents on software. With this case, on the contrary, it opened the door to 
the possibility of patenting software. The Supreme Court ruled that the patent claim covered 
                                                 
3 Thus, from 1980 on, numerous legislative measures, based on R&D and intellectual property rights, were taken 
to restore American competitiveness (Orsi, 2002). The software sector, together with that of living matter, helped 
to recover competitiveness in the 1990s. 
4 This procedure was developed in the United States to “draw on” the rival’s protected software without risking 
an infringement of copyright. There are two stages: (1) a first team is brought together: it analyses the rival’s 
software and draws up the functional specification; (2) the first team leaves the room. A second team comes in 
(without communicating with the first team) and uses the functional specification to design the programme to be 
marketed.   4
the whole invention, not just the algorithm used to make the invention function
5. In this case, 
the applicant could obtain a patent. 
 
This watershed decision paved the way for a whole wave of subsequent decisions allowing 
patents on software, as long as the invention was “useful” (Liotard, 2002). In particular, it led 
to the State Street v Signature ruling of 1998 on the possibility of patenting “business 
methods”. This term refers to a certain number of tools that can be useful in “doing 
business”. In the United States, this term is used for many applications that are now 
patentable: management or financial data processing methods, computing techniques and 
educational, organisational, e-business, consulting, marketing or financial methods. In the 
field of e-business, patents have been granted for systems of e-finance, on-line bookselling 
and auctions (Lerner, 2000; Hall, 2003).
6 
 
As a result of this series of rulings and jurisprudential decisions, the number of applications 
for software patents, especially internet-related patents, has rocketed in the recent past (Hunt, 
2001). In parallel with the overall number of patents in the United States, software-related 
patents have risen sharply, leading the USPTO to grant between 7,000 and 10,000 software 
patents, in a broad sense, per year. This figure rose to 25,000 patents per year in 2002 (Hunt 
and Bessen, 2004). It is interesting to note that this growth can be observed both for national 
and international applications (Graham and Mowery, 2002). Moreover, the companies most 
active in software patent applications are not packaged-software firms like Microsoft, but the 
twelve major players in the electronics sector
7. 
As for business methods, the 1990s saw an accelerated growth in internet-related patents in 
this domain. Less than 100 patents of this genre were granted before 1992 (Hunt, 2001). 
During the next five years, the Office granted 750 internet-related patents and then, from 1998 
on, the growth was astronomical. Nearly 4,000 were granted in 1999 and 5,700 in 2000, 
mainly to computing and telecommunications component manufacturers and software 
developers. 
 
b) Prudence in Europe 
Two underlying trends stand out in Europe’s approach to the question of strengthening 
property rights in the fields of software and business methods. 
Firstly, although article 52(2) (c) and article 52(3) of the European Patent Convention, signed 
in Munich on 5 October 1973, exclude from patentability “schemes, rules and methods for 
performing mental acts, playing games or doing business, and programs for computers (…) 
as such”, the practice of the European Patent Office has been quite different. Over the last 
twenty years, the Office has granted patents on software programmes, as long as they meet 
the technical criteria required by the examiner. Following three key decisions by the Boards 
of Appeal of the EPO
8, a computer programme can obtain patent protection if there is a  
“further technical effect”, whether direct or potential (Schwarz, 1997).  
                                                 
5 The Court ruled that a claim could be patentable even if it used a mathematical algorithm in the process, 
arguing that the inventor did not claim all his rights over future uses of the mathematical equation in question, 
but only for the particular application he had invented.  
6 See, for example, the “one-click” system of Amazon.com 
7 IBM, Intel, HP, Motorola, National Semiconductor, NEC, Digital Equipment Corp, Compaq, Hitachi, Fujitsu, 
Texas Instruments, Toshiba. 
8 These decisions are: Computer-related invention / Vicom T208/84 (1987) JO EPO 14; General purpose 
management system / Sohei T769/92 (1995) JO EPO 525; Computer program product / IBM T 1173/97 (1999) 
JO EPO 10.   5
Today, around 30,000 software-related patents have been granted by the EPO, the majority of 
them dealing with digital data processing, data recognition and information representation 
and processing (Van Den Bulck, 2005
9). 
Although, in practice, many software patents have been granted in Europe, the prevarication 
we have seen over the last two years in the drafting of a directive on the subject highlights the 
difficulty Europeans have in reaching agreement. The shuttling back and forth of proposals 
between the European Parliament, the Council of Ministers and the European Commission 
has further complicated matters, particularly given the divergent positions on the subject of 
software patentability. The last text proposed by the Council of Ministers, dated March 7 
2005, was submitted for a second reading in the European Parliament, which rejected it 
outright in July of the same year. So at present, Europe remains in the same state of affairs, 
where theory (the European Patent Convention) and practice (the EPO) are opposed. 
According to some commentators, this situation is actually worse, because the refusal to 
formalise EPO practice threatens the precarious existing equilibrium and encourages national 
jurisdictions to take more liberties in their appreciation of software patents
10. 
 
However, Europe is far from sharing the American enthusiasm for the patenting of business 
methods, whether we examine French jurisprudence
11 or that emanating from the European 
Patent Office (Warusfel, 2001 and 2003). Although more and more applications for business 
method patents are submitted
12, the EPO has maintained its position on the non-patentability 
of business methods which lack the technical character that is a pre-requisite for the granting 
of any patent. This was especially clear in the Pension Benefit System case (T931/95) of 
September 8 2000, brought before the Technical Board of Appeal of the EPO, in which the 
applicant was seeking a patent on a method of controlling a pension benefit system. 
According to the Board, not only did the process have no technical character, but it also 
resulted in no technical objective or effect. 
 
2) Offensive intellectual property strategies 
 
 
2.1) Intellectual property and technological standardisation  
 
Observation of the Information and Communication Technologies sectors shows that the 
phenomenon of technological standardisation is not only frequent, but essential to the 
development of such activities. These sectors are subject to powerful network effects and 
increasing returns of adoption (Katz and Shapiro, 1985; Arthur, 1989; Varian and Shapiro, 
1998; Stango, 2004). The size of the community of users, the rhythm and dynamic of 
adoption of one or another technology by these users, the fateful moment when one company 
attains the critical mass of consumers which will enable it to break through the absorbing 
barriers and win, all these elements are brought into play by certain companies in striving to 
reach the ultimate objective: to win the race to establish standards (where the winner takes all) 
                                                 
9 “Le Conseil Européen passe outre la volonté du Parlement et adopte la position commune sur la brevetabilité 
des logiciels”, actualité of 7 March 2005 http://www.droit-technologie.org. 
10 The consultation initiated by the European Commission in January 2006 has revived the debate on software 
patenting, in a broader context (that of Community Patents). 
11 See the decision of the Court of Appeal of Paris of January 10 2003 in the case Sagem versus INPI or the 
decision of the Court of Appeal of Rennes of October 7 2003 in the Antonietti case. 
12 Business methods are categorised in the class G06F17/60 in Europe. Notable examples include an application 
for a system to monitor the financial parameters of a stock market (application FR 2.765.368) or a home-
financing system comprising an income-based mortgage (application FR 2.669.449).   6
by capturing these club effects
13 and then, of course, to issue licenses to competitors in the 
sector. Literature on this subject has been abundant, analysing a certain number of examples 
of standards wars, or at least the establishment of standards in different domains (the Qwerty 
keyboard, video cassette recorders, personal computers, etc.). It has also studied system 
goods, where the concept of standards takes on its full significance (Economides, 1996). 
 
One of the means to attain this objective is the strategic use of intellectual property. Many 
past examples demonstrate the range of possible strategies. The aim is to ensure one’s own 
technology wins the standards race, whether these are de facto or de jure standards, and then 
either to rally other producers to these standards or, in the most extreme cases, to prevent 
rivals from using them and so remain the sole supplier (Bekkers and Liotard, 1999; Dolmans, 
1998; Liotard, 2000; Blind and Thumm, 2004). In fact, a company developing a technology 
has two options: either to adopt a relatively open standards policy, by issuing numerous 
(inexpensive) licenses, or to adopt a closed strategy, restricting licenses to use the technology 
(by asking a high price or through the strict selection of licensees)
14. This choice is far from 
trivial, for it is emblematic of two alternative strategies: maximising volumes and thus market 
share or maximising rent (Gabel, 1991). These choices contribute to the strategic positioning 
of the firm in the “market for standards” (Grindley, 1995): either an open or a closed license 
strategy may be the winning one, depending on the “product”. Examples abound. Sony with 
the VCR and Apple with its computer both chose closed, proprietary strategies: this worked 
for Apple but not for Sony. JVC and IBM, on the other hand, chose open license strategies for 
their respective standards (VCR and computer); this proved to be a successful choice in both 
cases (Besen and Saloner, 1989). 
 
The arrival of internet at the beginning of the 1990s gave a big boost to new technologies and 
their development. Since then, the digital economy and its internet showcase have 
transformed means of production, consumption and working. Here, it is worth exploring the 
question of whether these changes have also modified corporate strategies towards   
establishing standards, and whether or ont intellectual property is being put to new uses in this 
context. 
 
The underlying idea is based on this point: fundamentally, the intellectual property strategies 
deployed by firms in their search to establish standards have not changed with the advent of 
new digital technologies. What has changed, we believe, is the speed of diffusion of new 
technologies and the particular size of the market, which, with internet, instantly becomes a 
global market. Two examples provide clear illustrations of this: the standards war over Web 
browsers and the current war over DRM. 
 
a)  The standards war and Web browsers: intellectual property and incompatibility 
Much of interest can be drawn from an analysis of the war between internet navigation 
systems (Windrum, 2004), or rather the wars, because there were two of them. The first was 
between Netscape and Mosaic, the first ever navigation system; the second was between 
Netscape and Microsoft. Analysing the reasons behind Netscape’s success in the first war and 
Microsoft’s success in the second, we can see that, far from being the key element in the 
winning strategy, intellectual property was simply one of several factors. Two features 
contributed to Netscape’s victory in the years 1994 – 1995: firstly, the quality of its browser,  
                                                 
13 This involves using an installed base of customers of a technology to create a bandwagon effect so as to 
generate path dependency and reinforcing effects. 
14 Note, however, that a continuum of possible strategies, partially open or partially closed, exists between these 
two extremes.   7
easier and more user-friendly than its rival; secondly, Netscape’s innovative commercial 
strategy of signing agreements with other software companies and adopting an aggressive 
pricing policy
15. Although, of course, the extensions added to each new version of Navigator 
were proprietary, we cannot speak of a veritable “property” strategy here. 
Likewise, in the Microsoft – Netscape conflict, other levers played a crucial role in the 
success of Explorer. Microsoft, which launched the war in 1995-1996, didn’t rely on either 
the technological superiority of its system or an innovative pricing policy (it used the same 
commercial techniques as Netscape). Microsoft’s strategy was based on generating 
incompatibility with Navigator and included the addition of proprietary extensions, with each 
new version, which prevented Navigator from reading Web pages written using Explorer. 
This strategy, relying on the idea that Web page editors only use one format, to keep costs 
down, was combined with a series of agreements with editors and internet providers and, of 
course, the tremendous springboard provided by the Windows installed base. The consequent 
troubles of Netscape are common knowledge. 
Intellectual property played a more important role in Microsoft’s approach, as it was exploited 
by the company to heighten the incompatibility between its own system and that of Netscape.  
 
b)  The war of online music platforms: the stakes of DRM  
Digital Rights Management systems are anti-copying systems associated with online music 
download platforms (i Tunes, Virgin Mega, Sony Music, AOL Music, etc.). A relatively 
recent arrival on the technological scene, DRM has been structuring a new market in the legal 
music downloading over the last two years. It is the music industry majors’ response to the 
problem of illegal downloading, an attempt to make up for the financial loss caused by 
pirating. This protection minimises the risks of music file sharing. The platforms provide 
producers with a certain “traceability” of the exploitation of their catalogues.  
These DRMs are the subject of a standards war which has currently taken the form of 
incompatibility between the different systems, with each system being protected by 
intellectual property rights. Today, each platform is associated with a particular DRM, and an 
internaut who buys music on a given platform can only listen to it on the music 
player “associated” with that platform (iPod and iTunes from Apple; mp3 from Sony with 
Sony Music) and not on any other. The music industry, on the back of the computing industry 
which delivers the systems, is creating an environment of incompatibility for the consumer. In 
practical terms, Apple has the most closed proprietary strategy: Apple refuses to grant 
licenses for its DRM technology (Fairplay) to other music distributors and music player 
manufacturers (except under very restrictive conditions). So the owners of Apple machines 
are not free to go over to rivals, and the company has been accused of blocking the market.  
Apple’s challengers, on the other hand, have more open strategies in their licensing policies, 
with the avowed aim of taking market share from Apple. Microsoft is aiming to diffuse its 
system as widely as possible and to supplant Apple in the standards war, while Real Network, 
with its Harmony DRM, is seeking to increase compatibility between the different systems. 
This situation is not to everyone’s taste, and certain initiatives that have been undertaken 
demonstrate the pressing desire to bring an end to system incompatibility. This was the aim of 
the Coral consortium, which brought together some of the industry majors
16 and aimed to 
render DRM systems compatible with each other. The members of Coral have now joined the 
Marlin Joint Development Association,
17 which seeks the creation of a common DRM 
standard (the first version of which is planned in an open-source format). Today, it seems 
                                                 
15 Producing Beta versions, as well as a commercial version offering a free 90-day trial period. 
16 HP, Sony, Philips, Samsung, Matsuhita, Intertrust, 20th Century Fox): note that neither Apple nor Microsoft 
were members of the consortium. 
17 Intertrust, Matsushita, Philips, Sony and Samsung.   8
clear that the players involved have divergent standpoints: if we draw on Besen and Saloner’s 
analysis (1989), crossing the individual interest in promoting one’s own standard and the 
collective interest in having a universal standard, Apple and Microsoft are the two 
protagonists in a situation of conflict (high individual interest and high interest in establishing 
a unique standard), while the others in the industry are pushing for a solution of coordination, 
in which the desire to establish a compatible standard prevails over individual interests. Apple 
and Microsoft are in the situation described by Besen and Farrell (1994) in 
their “Tweedledum and Tweedledee” game, where each is trying to impose his own standard. 
The strategies adopted by the two companies with regard to DRM are consistent with the 
authors’ list of strategies used to win the standards war: (i) building a large customer base as 
soon as possible; (ii) attracting suppliers of complementary products; (iii) using product pre-
announcement as a means of attracting consumers; (iv) making long-term price commitments. 
At present, the outcome of this struggle is uncertain, bearing in mind the fact that several 
configurations are possible: (i) non-standardisation, as happened in the video games sector; 
(ii) the success of one sole proprietary system; (iii) an ad hoc solution arising out of 
collaboration. 
 
2.2) Towards the more offensive use of patents 
 
The opening of the door to software patents twenty years ago, and to business methods more 
recently, raises several questions. 
 
a)  In terms of innovation.  
The software industry is a sequential activity characterised by successive, complementary 
innovations (Bessen and Maskin, 2000; Merges and Nelson, 1994). Like the 
telecommunications or semiconductor industries, this is a cumulative activity in which 
previous innovations always serve as the foundation for subsequent innovations, rather like a 
pyramid (Shapiro, 2001).  In addition, the increasingly important role of software in the 
technologies of a growing number of sectors means that applications are incredibly varied and 
involve more traditional sectors (the car industry, for example) just as much as high 
technology sectors. On these grounds, it is reasonable to wonder whether the strengthening of 
the protection of software may have deleterious effects on the rate of innovation. Today, it is 
almost impossible for a software editor or programmer not to encroach on what has already 
been produced: software is like a set of Russian dolls, in which each system fits into another.  
If part of the system is protected by patent, the risk is that this may slow down or even 
paralyse innovation. We have only to refer to the literature developed by Scotchmer (1991), 
who analysed the relations between basic innovation and second generation innovation. The 
protection conditions of the basic patent (in terms of scope, claim, etc.) have an important 
influence on the incentives of future innovators to invest in R&D. 
Certain economists have echoed these concerns. Shapiro (2001), for example, highlights the 
fact that the current American patent system generates relatively perverse effects on 
innovation and raises barriers to the entry of new players, blocking the construction of the 
famous R&D pyramid with a “patent thicket”. 
Under these circumstances, the question facing Europeans is whether their refusal to patent 
business methods on the one hand, and their recent back-tracking on software patents on the 
other, will have an unfavourable impact on firms’ competitiveness (Liotard, 2004). At the 
present time, we are still in the realm of questions: how can a European firm be competitive 
vis-a-vis an American rival which, thanks to its patents, can not only prevent the European 
firm from penetrating the U.S., but also directly challenge it on its own territory? This 
situation could be prejudicial to European companies, by increasing their costs. How can we   9
resolve the juridical imbroglio of the internet, a global system par excellence, whose Web 
functions and develops within territorial legal systems? Clearly, the problems just keep on 
arising, and the task facing the European authorities today is to take all these elements into 
consideration in a profound investigation of the matter. 
 
b)  The equilibrium of terror: the use of legal proceedings 
Because of this multitude of patents, the number of lawsuits and license agreements required 
to resolve these conflicts has risen disproportionately, even opposing small and large 
companies
18. Under these circumstances, the concerns about the software sector are serious, 
all the more so since its involvement in and relations with the domain of the internet and e-
business are becoming ever denser. The principal fear today concerns the effects of software 
and business methods patentability on the development of the Web and the possible strategies 
of players that are beginning to appear: the growing number of lawsuits for infringement of 
software patents in the United States is an indicator of new trends and of attempts to block 
awkward rivals
19. Litigations over industrial property grew three times as fast as civil cases in 
the United States between 1993 and 2002 (FTI Intellectual Property 2003). 
These multiple lawsuits have been excessively costly for business: the cost a lawsuit for one 
single patent has been estimated at 1.2 million dollars
20. The direct consequence of this is that 
small firms have great difficulty in defying larger firms on this terrain, where the larger firms 
have been likened to a “small mafia of monopoly holders” (Gleick 2000). In addition, the big 
firms now pull even more weight on the technological scene, thanks to their patent portfolios 
and licensing practices (in all forms: simple, crossed, patent pools). So in the United States, 
the income generated by license agreements grew from 15 billion dollars in 1990 to 100 
billion in 1998 and 130 billion in 2000. IBM alone generates 1.6 billion dollars in licenses. 
However, these observations on litigation need to be qualified. Given the very high cost of 
lawsuits (especially during what is called the “discovery” phase in the United States), very 
few disputes get taken as far as court action, as the parties involved negotiate well before this: 
about 80% of disputes are settled out of court, by means of license agreements. These data 
corroborate the idea that lawsuits are a real corporate weapon, seen by firms as a strategic tool 
for achieving their objectives, without necessarily going as far as a court decision at the end of 
a long and costly process. For certain firms, this can represent a means of driving their rivals 
into a corner, obliging them either to issue or to pay for licenses under the threat of pursuing 
the legal proceedings. In the case of lawsuits involving patents on business methods, the most 
important disputes have all been resolved by license agreements before the end of the court 
action.  
So a portfolio of patents on software or business methods puts the holder in a strong position 
as regards the negotiation of licenses, resulting in a sort of “reign of terror” where competitors 
are constantly under the threat of lawsuits. The high number of disputes involving financial 
patents after 1998 bears witness to this (Lytle and Signore, 2004): the vast majority of cases 
involving players in the spheres of finance or insurance have resulted in victory for the patent 
holders, who can, thanks to legal action, bring an end to their competitors’ activities, obtain 
damages, receive license fees, sign crossed license agreements or defend themselves against 
other holders. Because the patentability of business methods is a relatively recent 
phenomenon, it is still difficult to give a definitive opinion on the effects this sort of 
                                                 
18 For example, the lawsuit between Intertrust Technologies and Microsoft over patents held by the former and 
which were alleged to have been used by the latter for the Windows Media system (Shapiro 2001). 
19 Amazon.com vs Barnes&Noble, Priceline v Expedia: see the synthetic table proposed by Hall (2003) for 
examples of lawsuits. 
20 The AIPLA Economic Report (2001) estimates that for each of the parties involved in a lawsuit, the average 
cost rose from 400,000$ in 1999 to nearly 500,000$ in 2001.   10
protection is having on the nature and rate of innovation. Still, we can put forward certain 
hypotheses: it is clear that we are witnessing a proliferation in such patents, and the number of 
lawsuits is growing as a consequence, increasing the overall costs of the system. It is 
reasonable to believe that, as has been observed in other industries, these patents are a vector 
for capturing rents through license agreements, as well as a means of obtaining their 
financing, particularly through venture capital. 
 
Conclusion 
On the strength of these observations, it is clear that intellectual property constitutes a weapon 
in the hands of economic players, a weapon used to take position in a market, to impose a 
standard (or to wage war against other technological solutions) and even to hinder other 
competitors. Henceforth, certain questions call for analysis in future research: (i) will the 
strategic use of patents or copyright have an effect in the future on the development of the 
internet, which is still considered a domain with relatively weak barriers to entry? In this “age 
of access” (Rifkin, 2000), just how far can one go in the use of intellectual property? (ii) 
Should the tools provided by competition law be used as they are, or should they be adapted 
to correct certain criminal tendencies involving intellectual property? We have recently 
witnessed ex post facto attempts to use patents to carry out technological “hold ups” (such as 
the case of the GIF image compression format): should internet-related markets be the object 
of special treatment by the competition authorities or not?   11
References 
 
ARTHUR, B. (1989) Competing Technologies, Increasing Returns and Lock-in by Historical 
Events, Economic Journal, 99, 106-131. 
BESEN, S. and FARRELL, J. (1994) Choosing how to compete: strategies and tactics in 
standardization, Journal of Economic Perspectives, vol 8 n°2, spring. 
BESEN, S. and SALONER, G. (1989) The economics of telecommunications standards, in 
RW CRANDALL and K FLAMM Changing the rules: technological change, international 
competition and regulation in communications (the Brookings Institution, Washington) 
BESSEN, J. and MASKIN, E. (2000) Sequential innovation, patents and imitation, Working 
Paper n°00-01, janvier, Department of Economics, Massachusetts Institute of Technology. 
BLIND, K and THUMM, N. (2004) Interrelation between patenting and standardisation 
strategies: empirical evidence and policy implications, Research Policy, 33  
DESROUSSEAUX, G. (2000) Brevet ou droit d’auteur  : un choix non exclusif pour la 
protection des créations logicielles, Conférence le 30 octobre 2000 à Poitiers. 
DOLMANS, M. (1998) Restrictions an innovation: an EU antitrust approach, Antitrust Law 
Journal 
Economides (1996) 
FTI Intellectual Property, (2003) in Communication aux 3
e Rencontres Internationales de la 
Propriété Intellectuelle, 6 et 7 oct., Paris. 
GABEL, L. (1991) Competitive strategies for product standards, Mac Graw Hill. 
GLEICK, J. (2000) Patently Absurd, The New York Times Magazine, 12 mars: 
http://www.nytimes.com/library/magazine/home/20000312mag-patents.html 
GRAHAM, S. and MOWERY, D. (2002) Submarines in Software? Continuation in US 
Software Patenting in the 1980s and 1990s, DRUID Summer Conference on Industrial 
Dynamics of the New ad Old Economy – Who is Embracing Whom? , Copenhague 6-8 juin.  
GRINDLEY, P. (1995) Standards strategy and policy: cases and stories, Oxford University 
Press. 
HALL, B. (2003) Business Methods Patents, Innovation and Policy, WP 9717, NBER, mai. 
HUNT, B. (2001) You can Patent that? Are Patents on Computers Programs and Business 
Methods Good for the New Economy ?, Business Review, 1
er trimestre, www.phil.frb.org 
HUNT, B. and BESSEN, J. (2004) The software patent experiment, Business Review, 3ème 
trimestre. 
KLINE, D. and RIVETTE, K. (2000) Rembrandts in the attic: unlocking the hidden value of 
patents, Harvard Business School Press. 
KORTUM, S. and LERNER, J. (1998) Stronger protection or technological revolution: what 
is behind the recent surge in patenting? Carnegie Rochester Conference Series on Public 
Policy, 48. 
LERNER, .J. (2000) Where does State Street lead ? A First Look at Finance Patents, 1971-
2000, WP 7918, NBER,: http://www.nber.org/papers/w7918 
LIOTARD, I. (2000) «  Normalisation, droits de propriété intellectuelle et concurrence  : 
l’exemple des télécommunications » Revue Internationale de Droit Economique, juin, n°2. 
LIOTARD, I. (2002) «  La brevetabilité des logiciels  : quelques éclaircissements sur 
l’évolution jurisprudentielle aux Etats-Unis  » in Revue d’Economie Industrielle Numéro 
Spécial Les droits de propriété intellectuelle : nouvelles frontières et nouveaux enjeux, n°99, 
2
ème trimestre. 
LIOTARD, I. (2004) «  Les brevets sur les méthodes commerciales  : état des lieux et 
perspectives économiques » à paraître dans Propriétés Intellectuelles, avril 2004, n°11.   12
LIOTARD, I. and BEKKERS, R. (1999) European Standards for mobile communications : 
the tense relations between standards and intellectual property rights, European Intellectual 
Property Review numéro 3 vol 21 mars. 
LYTLE, B. and SIGNORE P.(2004)  Finance Companies Rush to Patent Business Methods, 
février, www.managinip.com 
M. KATZ et C. SHAPIRO (1985) Network externalities, competition and compatibility, 
AER, vol 75, n°3, juin. 
MERGES, P. and NELSON, R. (1994) On limiting or encouraging rivalry in technical 
progress: the effects of patent scope decisions, Journal of Economic Behavior and 
Organization, vol 25. 
ORSI, F. (2002) La constitution d’un nouveau droit de propriété intellectuelle sur le vivant 
aux États-Unis, origine et signification économique d’un dépassement de frontière : Revue 
d’économie industrielle, numéro spécial, « Les droits de propriété intellectuelle : nouvelles 
frontières et nouveaux enjeux », 2
e trimestre, n° 99.  
RIFKIN, J. (2000) The age of access, GP Putmam’s sons, New York. 
SCHWARZ, T. (1997) Evolution sur la question de la brevetabilité des logiciels en droit 
européen des brevets, Droit de l’informatique et des télécoms, n°2. 
SCOTCHMER, S. (1991) Standing on the shoulders of giants: cumulative research and the 
patent law, Journal of Economic Perspective, vol 5, n°1, hiver 
SHAPIRO, C. (2001) Navigating the Patent Thicket: Cross-Licenses, Patent Pools, and 
Standard-Setting, Paper presented at the NBER conference “Innovation Policy and the 
economy”, April 12, 32p. http://haas.berkeley.edu/~shapiro/thicket.pdf 
SKULIKARIS, Y. (2001) Software-related inventions and business related inventions: a 
review of practice and case law in US and Europe, Patent World, février. 
STANGO, V (2004) The economics of standards wars, Review of Network Economics, vol 3, 
n°1, mars  
VARIAN H.R. and SHAPIRO C. (1998), “Information Rules. A Strategic Guide to the 
Network Economy, First Edition”. Boston, Harvard Business School Press.  
WARUSFEL, B. (2001) La brevetabilité des méthodes commerciales : l’Office européen des 
brevets résiste toujours, Propriétés intellectuelles oct. 2001, n° 1. 
WARUSFEL, B. (2003) La brevetabilité des méthodes commerciales devant les tribunaux 
français, Propriétés Intellectuelles avril, n° 7.  
WINDRUM, P. (2004) Leveraging technological externalities in complex technologies: 
Microsoft’s exploitation of standards in the browser wars, Research Policy, 33, 385-394. 
 